When the rainy day is the worst hurricane ever: the effects of governmental policies on SMEs during COVID-19 by Belghitar, Yacine et al.
Vol.:(0123456789)
1 
Small Bus Econ 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-021-00510-8
When the rainy day is the worst hurricane ever: the effects 
of governmental policies on SMEs during COVID‑19
Yacine Belghitar · Andrea Moro   · 
Nemanja Radić 
Accepted: 6 May 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
JEL Classifications D70 · E65 · G33 · H12 · L20 · L26
1 Introduction
The economic crisis linked to COVID-19 is very 
different from the last financial crisis (2007–2008) 
since it does not have a financial origin (bubble-burst 
cycle); it is the kind of black swan event that took 
the world economy by complete surprise (Aliber & 
Kindleberger, 2015; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Fitoussi 
& Saraceno, 2010; McGuinness & Hogan, 2016; 
Samatas et al., 2019). Besides, the consequences are 
dramatic: the USA expects a contraction of nearly 
11% in terms of real GDP (Baker et al., 2020), with 
small businesses that are particularly affected since 
they are typically financially fragile (Bartik et  al., 
2020; Fairlie & Fossen, 2021); in the UK, according 
to a recent McKinsey survey of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), nearly 60% of firms surveyed 
believe they will be out of business by for April 2021 
(Albonico et al., 2020). Indeed, the decision taken by 
many governments to confine people to stay in their 
houses to save lives has led to an acute cash crisis for 
many firms across different sectors. Firms operating 
in sectors such as tourism, hospitality, entertainment, 
and air transportation were particularly hard hit with 
their sales that are almost non-existent (ONS 2020). 
Leisure, entertainment, pubs, restaurants, and gyms 
are forced to close their operations overnight (Wig-
gins & Hancock, 2020). Travel limitations (allowed 
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ascribe this result to the fact that the schemes do not 
discriminate between those firms that deserve support 
and those that do not deserve it.
Keywords COVID-19 · Cash Small firms · 
Economic crisis · Government intervention
Y. Belghitar · A. Moro (*) · N. Radić 
Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield University, 






 Y. Belghitar et al.
1 3
only for key workers) force airlines to ground entire 
fleets and train operators to reduce their activity to 
the bare minimum running trains almost empty (FT 
Reporters, 2020). In a similar vein, the cash posi-
tion of consumer goods and retail firms is affected 
because of the reduced demand from households that 
are reshaping their spending habits (Wisniewski et al., 
2021) and cutting all non-essential spending because 
of the fear that the economic crisis can adversely 
affect their jobs and future income (Fairlie & Fos-
sen, 2021). Moreover, supply chain disruptions are so 
pervasive that even those firms that enjoyed a solid or 
increasing demand in their products (e.g. biotechnol-
ogy firms) are adversely affected because they were 
not able to satisfy the demand. As a consequence, a 
larger number of firms are not able to generate the 
cash they needed to cover the operations.
Past studies provided different motives to why 
firms should hold cash. Within the precautionary 
motive, firm should hold cash to meet unexpected 
contingencies (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2012). 
Almeida et  al. (2011) documented that firms with 
little cash reserves are less likely to survive a crisis. 
Evidence from 2007 to 2008 financial crisis sug-
gests that the probability of a firm’s survival depends 
largely on the level of cash held within its balance 
sheet (Kneer et al., 2019). The precautionary motive 
also suggests that firms with lower and more volatile 
cash flows, lower net working capital, higher R&D 
expenditure, and higher growth opportunities are 
more affected by a crisis and hence should hold more 
cash (Dittmar & Duchin, 2010; McLean, 2011; Opler 
et  al., 1999). While the extant cash holdings litera-
ture deals mainly with why firms hold cash, nothing 
is known about how long a firm can survive with its 
cash reserves in the midst of a crisis, like the COVID-
19. Against this background, we address the following 
research question: how long an SME can survive the 
unexpected COVID-19 shock given its cash reserves 
together with the provided UK government support? 
In so doing, we propose a novel forecasting approach 
based on firm’s earnings and cash reserves, in which 
sales shock and government supports are key inputs, 
to estimate the “residual life” of an SME under dif-
ferent scenarios. We are interested in finding out for 
how long an SME can survive the unexpected adverse 
shock linked to COIVID-19 given the cash it is able 
to generate and the cash it holds, and how the poli-
cies implemented by the UK government to support 
firms help SMEs to navigate the crisis by expanding 
the cash they can rely on. We perform our analysis 
by exploring the dynamics on a sample of 42,401 UK 
SMEs across 28 industries. Besides, since COVID-19 
is having different impact for different industries and 
different regions, we explore its impact both at indus-
try and on regional level.
To navigate through COVID-19’s hurricane is 
particularly difficult for SMEs for a different set of 
reasons. First, even if they are considered to be more 
flexible because of the flat organisational structure 
(Dean et al., 1998; Walker & Petty, 1978), in fact they 
are quite often characterised by a cost structure that 
is more rigid than larger organisations: even a small 
drop in sales can have an important impact on how 
efficiently the assets are used; the impact on the over-
all cost of each member of the staff is very relevant 
so that the decision to retain staff when sales tem-
porarily decline can have a relevant negative impact 
on profitability. Thus, abrupt changes can adversely 
affect them (Ang, 1992; Ang et  al., 1995). Sec-
ond, SMEs have limited cash reserves, also because 
entrepreneur’s decision to pursue certain business is 
not essentially linked to profit maximisation (Hamil-
ton, 2000; Kahneman, 2012; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Moskowitz & Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Moreo-
ver, SMEs are not necessarily able to generate high 
returns in good times to protect them during eco-
nomic downturns (Ang et al., 1995; Kahl et al., 2003; 
Moskowitz & Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Thus, a dra-
matic and sudden loss in the revenue and the related 
cash inflow can severely affect their ability to func-
tion as shown by empirical evidence (Ang, 1991, 
1992; Cressy, 2006; Ghosal & Ye, 2015) and further 
confirmed in the case of the COVID-19 crisis by 
empirical evidence from Northern Italy (Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2020), 
the UK (Albonico et  al., 2020) and the US (Fairlie 
& Fossen, 2021). Third, previous studies show that 
SMEs tend to hold low levels of cash compared to 
large firms because of their reduced dimension (Bel-
ghitar & Khan, 2013; Myers & Majluf, 1984). The 
consequence is that (fourth) they rely more on debt, 
leading to higher financial risk that can be unbearable 
during crises (Cassar & Holmes, 2003; Hutchinson, 
1999) particularly when the cash inflows dry up and 
they struggle to access credit needed (Carbó‐Valverde 
et  al. 2016; Casey & O’Toole, 2014; Moro et  al., 
2015). All in all, the above discussion suggests that 
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the cash position of SMEs will be more acute to the 
COVID-19 crisis.
Emerging research focusing on COVID-19 finds 
that SMEs are deferring investments, reducing labour 
costs or reducing expenses (Thorgren & Williams, 
2020), are increasing the use of bootstrap financing 
measures to mitigate the negative consequence of the 
crisis (Block et al., 2021), and are facing a significant 
reduction on entrepreneurial and innovative activity 
(Brown et  al., 2020). Moreover, research suggests a 
gender discrimination with women-led firms that are 
more adversely affected by COVID-19 than men-led 
ones (Graeber et al., 2021). Thus, it is not a surprise 
that policy makers have been asked to take actions 
to support them to deal with the crisis. In spring 
2020 the UK launched two supporting schemes: 
The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and 
the Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLS). The CJRS 
scheme allows the firm to avoid frictional costs linked 
to making employees redundant (e.g. the notice 
period) by furloughing employees so that the gov-
ernment covers 80% of their usual monthly wage up 
to £2500 a month. Any entity with a UK payroll can 
apply. The original scheme has been extended twice, 
and at the time of writing, it is expected to last until 
30 April 2021.1 BBLS scheme provides financial sup-
port to businesses across the UK by helping SMEs to 
borrow between £2000 and up to 25% of their turno-
ver via a government guarantee for the entire loan up 
to £50,000 so that firms can access credit in a period 
when banks are not keen to lend because of borrow-
ers deteriorating performance. Both schemes apply to 
UK-based firms from any sector (except banks, insur-
ers and reinsurers, public-sector bodies, and state-
funded primary and secondary schools2) established 
before 1 March 2020 and that, at the time it submits 
its application, were not into (1) collective insol-
vency proceedings, (2) received restructuring aid or 
subject to a restructuring, and (3) in bankruptcy or 
liquidation. The UK scheme is different from other 
European schemes such as the French one that grants 
SMEs with turnover below €1 million and drop in 
turnover of at least 70% a €1,500 monthly compensa-
tion, or the German one that provides direct subsidies 
to one-person businesses and micro-enterprises by 
relying on a €10 billion fund (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation & Development, 2020).
Past research suggests that policies aimed at facili-
tating access to finance and reducing the cost of 
borrowing can be helpful for firms in the short run 
(Duarte et al., 2018) and that the supporting policies 
(such as credit guarantees systems) may be effective 
in protecting the economy from collapsing (Yamori, 
2015), as they allow firms to access the cash that they 
need. However, it is also pointed out that these sup-
porting schemes can have a negative effect by dis-
couraging firms from improving their efficiencies 
(Yamori, 2015).
Our results show that government COVID-19 miti-
gation policies seem to be quite successful in support-
ing small and medium sized firms. The policies have 
three main effects: (1) they reduce the number of jobs 
that would have been lost; (2) they reduce the number 
of SMEs with negative EBITDA; and (3) they extend 
the life of those SMEs that are burning cash. Thus, 
at first sight, the results suggest that the policies are 
successful in protecting the economy. However, our 
analysis also suggests that the SMEs that benefit the 
most in terms of extended days of life are those that 
are weak irrespective of COVID-19 effect. Besides, 
when we focus on the regional impact, we find that 
the biggest beneficiary of government intervention 
is the London area, even if the areas that are facing 
the greater negative economic impact by COVID-19 
are Scotland and Northern Ireland. All in all, our evi-
dence suggests that these two schemes overprotect 
weak firms and are not able to target industries/areas 
that are worst hit. We argue that this happens because 
the interventions are very general and are not able to 
target those firms that deserve support.
2  Theoretical considerations and empirical 
framework
The concept of cash reserves (or holdings) can be 
traced back to Keynes (1936), who suggests three 
main motives for holding cash: (1) the transaction 
1 More information about the scheme can be found under 
guidance issued by GOV.UK, entitled Check if you can claim 
for your employees’ wages through the Coronavirus Job Reten-
tion Scheme. Available at https:// www. gov. uk/ guida nce/ claim- 
for- wage- costs- throu gh- the- coron avirus- job- reten tion- scheme
2 More information about the scheme can be found under 
guidance issued by GOV.UK, entitled Apply for a coronavirus 
Bounce Back Loan. Available at https:// www. gov. uk/ guida nce/ 
apply- for-a- coron avirus- bounce- back- loan
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motive, need of cash to realise current transactions; 
(2) the precautionary motive, the need of cash to pro-
vide security with respect to unforeseen future events; 
and (3) the speculative motive, the need of cash to 
take advantage of unforeseen opportunities (Saeed 
et al., 2015). The precautionary motive perhaps is the 
most relevant in a period of crisis when analysing the 
liquidity of the firm. It suggests that cash reserve is 
considered as a valuable buffer to meet unexpected 
contingencies (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2012).
As discussed at the outset of this paper, the cri-
sis linked to COVID-19 is mainly the result of the 
forced shut down of the economies because of the 
lockdown. This event halted the production and the 
services provided by many firms so that they were 
not able to offer their products/services anymore 
(possibly the most dramatic example are the leisure, 
travel, and entertainment industries). Besides, those 
firms that were allowed to maintain their production 
were adversely affected by the disruption of their sup-
ply chains and the constrains linked to the access of 
inputs. In such a context, firm’s capability to generate 
cash is essential in order to live and in particular to 
navigate during the crisis time. When the firm has a 
positive cash flow, it should be able to maintain the 
current operations since it generates enough cash to 
cover all its immediate costs; on the other hand, when 
the expected cash flow is negative, the SME is implic-
itly “burning cash”. In this case, the “residual life” of 
the SME depends on the burning rate that is how rap-
idly the negative cash flow consumes the cash hold-
ings that the SME can use in order to cover the cur-
rent excess costs (cash outflow). Actually, SMEs can 
rely on cash in bank and any other very liquid asset, 
but also on debtors that are expected to be converted 
in cash quite soon.
In order to explore SMEs’ capability to survive 
COVID-19, we develop a simple but versatile fore-
casting model based on the firm EBITDA, in which 
sales shock and government supports are key inputs. 
Our model builds on the shock that firms face on 
their sales and then see how it affects the capability 
of the firms to generate positive EBITDA. By relying 
on EBITDA, we follow past research (Altman, 1968; 
Altman et  al., 2012, 2020; Altman & Sabato, 2007; 
Mramor & Valentincic, 2003; Philosophov & Philos-
ophov, 1999, 2005; Pompe & Bilderbeek, 2005; J. 
Thomas & Evanson, 1987) that argues that EBITDA 
is a measure of firm’s capability to generate operating 
margin and that it is a good proxy for the cash gen-
erated by the firm. Besides, SMEs tend to disclose 
aggregated data so that it is not possible to estimate 
precisely the cash flow.
We estimate EBITDA and then the “residual life” 
of the SME under three different scenarios:
a) Ordinary scenario – expected EBITDA based on 
the past performance and not considering any 
negative effect linked to COVID-19 shock
b) Scenario with the shock on sales at industry level 
as generated by COVID-19 – Office of National 
Statistics estimated reduction (ONS 2020)
c) Scenario with the implementation of the UK gov-
ernment policies to support small firms (namely, 
the CJRS – also known as furlough scheme and 
similar to Italian “Cassa Integrazione Straordi-
naria” programme that was established in the 
1951 and the hugely modified in 1975 or the 
“Kurzarbeit” programme that was originally 
established in 1910 in Germany) – and the BBLS
Our estimations are based on data up to 2018 in 
order to rely on a large dataset of 42,401 observations. 
Then, we re-estimate the three scenarios using 2019 
data (the sample reduces to 18,626 observations).
2.1  The calculation of the expected EBITDA
We assume the SME-specific relationship between 
change in sales, change in cost of goods sold (COGS), 
and change in cost of labour. We work out separate 
ratios because: (1) COGS and labour-related costs 
have different sensitivities to sales depending on how 
the firm runs operations (insourcing vs outsourcing; 
the role of raw material vs the role of labour; the capi-
tal intensity vs labour intensity of the production pro-
cess; etc.) and (2) the UK governments launched a job 
specific scheme – the CJRS – that covers the cost of 
furloughed employees during the crisis period. Thus, 
in order to appreciate the real impact of this scheme, 
it is mandatory to keep the evolution of labour-related 
costs in isolation.
First, we estimate the sensitivity  of change in 
COGS to change in sales for each year in the 3-year 
time window. Then, we average the two variations to 
obtain i,k that is the sensitivity of the change of the 
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COGS to change is sales of the SME k, operating in 
the industry i. Thus, the sensitivity is given by:
where Si,k,t are the sales and COGSi,k,t are the cost of 
goods sold of the SME k in industry i in year t. In a 
similar way, we work out the SMEs’ specific labour 
sensitivity i,k that is the change in labour costs to 
change in sales of the SME k operating in the industry 
i as:
where S, t, k, and i are defined as above, and WORK 
are the labour costs.
We then estimate the SME specific expected 
change in sales for the year 2020 without COVID-19 
by using the average change in sales for each SME for 
the 3-year period as follows:
where S, t, k, and i are defined as above. By relying 
on these sensitivities and the sales growth rate, we 
estimate the expected EBITDA for each SME in the 
case the operations were not affected by any shock as:
where (1 + (i,k))S(i,k,L) is the estimation of the expected 
sales of the SME k belonging to industry i based on 
the most recent year L, i,k(i,k)S(i,k,L) is the estimate of 
the change in COGS linked to the increase in sales, and 
i,k(i,k)S(i,k,L) is the estimate of the change in labour 
costs linked to the expected change in sales. The values 
resulting from this estimation are considered the base 
case under no COVID-19 shock (ORD).
For each SME, we can estimate the days of resid-









































E(EBITDA)(i,k)ORD > 0 ⇒ 𝜆(i,k)ORD = ∞
E(EBITDA)(i,k)ORD < 0 ⇒ 𝜆(i,k)ORD = −
τ(i,k)
E(EBITDA)(i,k)ORD
where τ = Cash holdingsi,k,L + Creditors(i,k,L) and  
represent the percentage of the non-delinquent cus-
tomers. In the basic scenario, (ORD)  is set to 1 (i.e. 
we assume no delinquency since the delinquency 
ratio of the years before COVID-19 is very small and 
limited to few firms), so that τ represents the residual 
cash available to the SME. If the E(EBITDA)(i,k)ORD 
is positive, the SME is able to generate enough cash 
and will not consume cash holdings (if anything, 
it increases them), while in the scenario of nega-
tive E(EBITDA)(i,k)ORD, the SME burns cash and has 
a residual limited life which depends on the burn-
ing rate and the cash available (cash holdings). The 
expected residual days are given by (i,k)ORD.
2.2  The impact of COVID-19
In order to explore the impact of the current pan-
demic, we proceed by introducing the industry-spe-
cific COVID-19-related shock i that captures sales 
reduction for each industry as estimated by the Office 
of National Statistics and released on 14 July 2020 
(ONS 2020). We scale the SME specific expected 
change in sales by (1 − i) . The new estimation of the 
EBITDA is therefore given as follows:
where (1 − i)(1 + (i,k))S(i,k,L) represents the new 
expected level of sales for the SME k in industry i 
due to shock linked to the change of sales i in the 
in industry i, (1 − i)(COGS(i,k,L) + i,k(i,k)S(i,k,L)) 
is the new level of COGS, and 
(1 − i)(WORK(i,k,L) + i,k(i,k)S(i,k,L)) is the new level 
of labour-related costs.
Also, in this case, we estimate the days of residual 
life for the ordinary scenario using the below rule:
We adjust for the economic shock by keeping 
into consideration that customers are trying to retain 
as much cash as possible. Since firms face a stop/
reduced activity for around 3/3.5 months (around 30% 

















E(EBITDA)(i,k)COVID > 0 ⇒ 𝜆(i,k)COVID = ∞
E(EBITDA)(i,k)COViD < 0 ⇒ 𝜆(i,k)COVID = −
τ(i,k)
E(EBITDA)(i,k)COVID
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of cash that implies a similar percentage in terms of 
debtors’ default. Needless to say, this is an estimate. 
However, it is also important to point out that any 
different percentage in terms of payments received/
delinquency has a proportional effect on the lack of 
cash and variation of the residual days.
2.3  The mitigating role of government intervention
There are two major policies implemented by the UK 
government to support businesses: CJRS and BBLS. 
By covering labour costs, the CJRS allows the firm 
to retain their staff. In addition, the scheme allows 
the firm to avoid frictional costs linked to making 
employees redundant (e.g. the notice period and dis-
missing costs). We estimate the improvement in the 
EBITDA linked to CJRS to be as follows:
where (1 − i)(WORK(i,k,L) + i,k(i,k)S(i,k,L)) is the 
cost of labour under COVID-19 that consider SME’s 





(1 − i)(1 + (i,k))S(i,k,L) is the (theoretical) 
cost of labour the SME would have incurred without 
any friction by making employees redundant. This 
implies that the E(EBITDA)(i,k)CRJS is the corrected 
EBITDA taking into consideration the benefit of 
CJRS, and it is expressed as follows:
We estimate the days of life with CJRS according 
the rule:
As far as the BBLS, the government intervention 
consists in underwriting bank loans up to 50,000 
GBP. The rationale of this intervention is to grant 
credit access to small firms in a period when banks 
are not keen to lend because of the deteriorating per-
formance of SMEs and the increased risk of default 
on loan repayments. BBLS impact is not in terms 
of cost reduction but in terms of increased cash 
(8)









(1 − i)(1 + (i,k))S(i,k,L)
(9)E(EBITDA)CJRS = E(EBITDA)Covid + CJRS
(10)
{
E(EBITDA)CJRS > 0 ⇒ 𝜆CJRS = ∞
E(EBITDA)CJRS < 0 ⇒ 𝜆CJRS = −
τ(i,k)
E(EBITDA)CJRS
holdings. To explore BBLS, we adjust the survival 
days and use to the following rule:
so that CRJS+BBLS gives the new estimation of 
residual days for SMEs thanks to the extra covered 
costs and the extra cash available because of both 
government schemes.
2.4  Data
Our analysis relies on UK data about SMEs with sales 
and total assets size between 10,000 and 50,000,000 
GBP and a number of employees up to 250. Thus, our 
sample of SMEs is in line with the definition of small 
and medium enterprise according to the EU standards 
(European Commission 2003). We use firm-level data 
obtained from the Fame – Bureau van Dijk – database 
for the fiscal years 2016–2019. To draw meaningful 
inferences, we require each SME to have at least 3 years 
of data. We exclude SMEs classed as public adminis-
tration, education, health social services (BvD sector), 
guarantee (legal form), and SMEs without employees. 
Overall, this results in an original sample size of 42,401 
firm observations across 28 industries in the UK.
Table 1 provides SMEs key descriptive statistics for 
the main variables used in the empirical framework. 
We find that, on average, an SME has total assets of 7.3 
million with 47 workers. Further, the average cash held 
in the bank is about £967,000 (13.3% of total assets), 
while on average, SME owes £1,370,000 (18.8% of 
total assets). Moreover, the average firm creditor claim 
is £804,000 (11% of total assets). Turning attention on 
the split dataset (weak vs solid ones) it is interesting 
to stress that even if weaker firms have averages for all 
the variables considered that are greater than the solid 
ones, nevertheless the differences are not different 
since both weak and solid firms subsamples are charac-
terised by very large standard deviations.
3  Results
Table 2 presents the results on the entire sample for 
the tree scenarios: ordinary scenario (expected situ-
ation without COVID-19), scenario that includes the 
(11)
{
if E(EBITDA)CJRS+LOAN > 0 ⇒ 𝜆CRJS = ∞
if E(EBITDA)CJRS+LOAN < 0 ⇒ 𝜆CRJS+BBLS = −
τ(i,k)+BBLS
E(EBITDA)CJRS
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impact of COVID-19 and the scenario that considers 
UK government intervention aid policies. We start 
by analysing the expected EBITDA and residual 
cash available for each SME. In the ordinary sce-
nario, we find that the average expected EBITDA 
is positive (£1,77 million), suggesting that the aver-
age SME is able to generate enough margin to sup-
port its operations. The survival rate (that is the 
percentage of SMEs generating positive EBITDA) is 
75%. Besides, those SMEs that are not able to cover 
the current operations and the related cash outflows 
with the cash inflows (that is, those SMEs that are 
burning cash) have on average 164  days of cash to 
cover the operations (ordinary scenario, rows 1–3).
Next, we focus on the two scenarios that include 
the shock/disruption. First, we estimate SMEs’ 
EBITDA according to the shock on sales at indus-
try level as generated by COVID-19 (no govern-
ment mitigation). Second, we estimate the EBITDA 
by including the two government mitigation poli-
cies (CJRS or BBLS). Focusing on the SMEs 
under COVID-19 scenario (rows 4–6), we find 
that the average firm in the sample is burning cash 
(EBITDA: − 1,05 million GBP) which is reflected 
via the dramatically lower “survival rate” that drops 
from 75 to 41%. Besides, the residual life for those 
SMEs that burn cash is now on average 139  days. 
When we include the government mitigation poli-
cies (rows 7–11), we find that the average EBITDA 
is still negative (− 621,000 GBP). Also, and as a 
direct result of government intervention, “residual 
life” for SMEs that burn cash increases to 183 due 
to CJRS, or (by also including BBLS) between 189 
and 194 (depending on the amount of loan taken). 
All in all, the government intervention has two posi-
tive effects: (1) it reduces the number of SMEs with 
negative EBITDA by 10% (50.30 vs 41.41%), and 
(2) it extends the survival days of those SMEs with 
negative EBITDA (SMEs that are burning cash) 
by 50 to 60 days. Our results reflect what has been 
found in Germany (Block et al., 2020).
Lastly, we investigate the effects on the number 
of jobs that are at risk as a result of the economic 
shock. We estimate this by looking at the number 
of jobs associated to SMEs with negative EBITDA 
in different scenarios. We find that due to COVID-
19 the number of jobs at risk in our sample 
increases to 24,843 (from 10,461 in ordinary sce-
nario) but when the CJRS is taken into considera-
tion so that labour costs are partially covered by 
the government, the jobs at risk decrease to 20,650 
(17% decrease).
Further evidence of the effect of COVID-19 and 
the policies implemented by the UK government 
emerges from Fig. 1A, B, and C.
COVID-19 moves the distribution of the expected 
EBITDA to the left, increasing dramatically the 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics entire dataset
This table provides the summary statistics for the main vari-
ables used in the empirical framework. Sales, average amount 
of sales in the three years; COGS, average cost of goods sold 
(net labour costs) in the 3 years; WORK, average cost of labour 
in the 3  years; Debtors, average end of year debtors in the 
3 years; Creditors, average end of year creditors in the 3 years; 
Cash in bank, average end of year cash in bank in the 3 years; 
Employees, average number of employees in the 3 years
a Full sample,n: 42,401 SMEs
b Weak firms, n: 10,461 SMEs
c Solid firms, n: 31,940 SMEs
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Full sample,n: 42,401  SMEsa
Sales 8042 9104 8.60 49,978
COGS 7471 7828 0.00 39,957
WORK 3799 4833 0.00 39,209
Debtors 1370 1730 0.00 9992
Cash in bank 967 1526 0.00 9993
Creditors 804 1229 0.00 9971
Employees 47 52 1.00 409
Total assets 7292 8307 10.00 62,769
Weak firms, n: 10,461  SMEsb
Sales 9908 9702 10.88 49,467
COGS 9323 8288 0.00 39,957
WORK 5141 5162 0.00 39,209
Debtors 1726 1833 0.00 9,992
Cash in bank 1069 1566 0.00 9987
Creditors 1040 1367 0.00 9845
Employees 56 55 1.00 409
Total assets 8507 8077 10.25 49,704
Solid firms, n: 31,940  SMEsc
Sales 7430 8801 8.60 49,978
COGS 6864 7522 0.00 39,916
WORK 3360 4635 0.00 39,054
Debtors 1253 1676 0.00 9982
Cash in bank 933 1512 0.00 9987
Creditors 727 1166 0.00 9971
Employees 44 51 1.00 297
Total assets 6894 8350 10.00 62,769
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negative tail of the distribution. The government miti-
gation policies readjust the distribution moving it to 
the right. However, EBITDA distribution after the 
government intervention is more concentrated around 
the zero than the distribution without COVID-19.
Our next step is to explore the effect of COVID-
19 on the vulnerable SMEs, that is SMEs with nega-
tive EBITDA in the ordinary scenario. The results are 
reported in Table 3.
In fact, these SMEs are expected to burn cash 
irrespective of COVID-19 and consequently to 
be at greater risk and have a shorter residual life. 
The average EBITDA of these firms in the sample 
is − 2,85 million GBP. Considering the cash hold-
ings these SMEs have, their average expected residual 
life is 164  days (ordinary scenario, rows 1–3). Dur-
ing COVID-19 scenario (rows 4–6), the EBITDA 
goes down further (− 3,75 million GBP), so that the 
residual life reduces to 119  days (4  months). When 
we account for the government mitigation policies 
(rows 7–11), the average EBITDA improves and goes 
back to levels very close to those of ordinary scenario 
level (− 2,84 million GBP). Besides, the survival 
rate improves to 8.3%. Consequently, the residual 
life increases to 186 days due to CJRS, or via BBLS 
between 191 and 194 days, depending on the amount 
of loan taken. As far as jobs at risks are concerned, 
there is no difference between ordinary and COVID-
19 scenarios (and this is expected as these SMEs 
have jobs at risk regardless). Thus, the only expected 
impact would be via CJRS for which the job losses 
decrease to 9584: by supporting weak SMEs, the gov-
ernments’ mitigation policy allows SMEs to retain 
877 jobs (protecting 8.4% of potential job losses)3 and 
Table 2  Results for the entire dataset
This table presents the results for tree scenarios: ordinary scenario, impact of COVID-19, and government intervention policies, and 
their impact on the performance and residual life of the firm for the entire dataset. The variables are defined as follows: EBITDA_B, 
estimate of the EBTDA under standard condition; SURVIVE_B, proportion of firms that have a positive estimated EBITDA; 
LIFE_DAYS_B, days of available cash to cover the negative EBITDA_B (the value is estimated only for those firms with a negative 
EBITDA_B; EBITDA_C, estimate of the EBTDA under COVID-1919 shock; SURVIVE_C, proportion of firms that have a positive 
estimated EBITDA under COVID-19; LIFE_DAYS_C, days of available cash to cover the negative EBITDA_C (the value is esti-
mated only for those firms with a negative EBITDA_C); EBITDA_G, estimate of the EBTDA under including the effect of govern-
ment mitigation policies; SURVIVE_G, proportion of firms that have a positive estimated EBITDA under government mitigation 
policies; LIFE_DAYS_C, days of available cash to cover the negative EBITDA_G (the value is estimated only for those firms with 
a negative EBITDA_G); JOB_LOSS_B, number of jobs at risk in the ordinary scenario (e.g. number of jobs linked to firms with a 
negative EBITDA_B); JOB_LOSS_G, number of jobs at risk in the COVID-19 scenario (e.g. number jobs linked to firms with a 
negative EBITDA_C); JOB_LOSS_G, number of jobs at risk in the scenario with mitigating policies (e.g. number jobs linked to 
firms with a negative EBITDA_G)
n 42,401
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Ordinary EBITDA_B 1769.14 4750.70  − 19,990.02 19,995.18
SURVIVE_B 75.33% 0.43 - 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_B 164 151 - 547
COVID-19 EBITDA_C  − 1048.06 3401.94  − 24,907.47 19,811.36
SURVIVE_C 41.41% 0.49 - 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_C 139 143 - 547
Gov’t mitigation policies EBITDA_G  − 621.57 3087.05  − 19,997.38 19,811.36
SURVIVE_G 51.30% 0.50 - 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_G 183 152 - 547
LIFE_DAYS_G + 25,000 189 150 0 547
LIFE_DAYS_G + 50,000 194 149 1 547
Effects on jobs Job_loss_B 10,461
Job_loss_C 24,843
Job_loss_G 20,650
3 We also estimate firms with expected positive ordinary 
EBITDA that turns to negative. These results are available 
upon the requests from the authors.
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extends firms’ life for a period longer than the average 
survival period these firm had without COVID-19.
We also estimate the impact on SMEs with a posi-
tive EBITDA (Table 4) in order to be able to compare 
the effect of the policies for strong and weak SMEs.
In this case, the EBITDA under COVID-19 is mar-
ginally negative − 162,000 GBP. A closer look at the 
distribution of earnings shows that around 53% of the 
SMEs have negative EBITDA. The expected residual 
life of strong SMEs is 162  days. The government 
mitigation policies improve the EBITDA to positive 
160,000 GBP, and the number of SMEs with positive 
EBITDA increases to 65%. In addition, the residual 
life of the SME with negative EBITDA is between 
180 (CJRS only) and 193 days (CJRS and BBLS at 
50,000 GBP). However, not all the firms that would 
have been profitable without COVID are profitable 
under the two governmental schemes since around 
35% maintain a negative performance.
To further explore the SMEs’ capability to survive 
the pandemic, we perform two additional checks, 
focusing on different regions and on different indus-
tries (these results are shown in Tables 5 and 6).
In our ordinary scenario (columns 3–5, Table  5), 
out of all the regions, SMEs in Wales have the low-
est expected EBITDA (£1,06 million) with a survival 
rate of 69.5% and 154 days of available cash. SMEs 
in Midlands have the highest expected EBITDA 
(£1,91 million), while SMEs in South East have the 
highest survival rate of 77.4%. During COVID-19 
scenario (with no government intervention, columns 
6–8), SMEs in Scotland are the hardest hit on average 
with EBITDA of − 1,36 million GBP and a survival 
rate of 33.6%, while SMEs in Northern Ireland have 
the least cash days available (127  days). SMEs in 
London have the highest survival rate, 45.1%, and the 
longest expected residual life of those SMEs burning 
cash (154 days). Focusing on the government mitiga-
tion policies (columns 9–13), we find that both the 
EBITDA and the survival rate improve, when com-
pared to the ordinary scenario. Survival rate improves 
across all regions with improvements between 9 and 
13%. More specifically and focusing on CJRS only, 
SMEs have between 9 and 42 extra days, even com-
pared to pre COVID-19 levels. The only exception 
here is Northern Ireland, which starts with 178 days 
of cash (during ordinary scenario) but ends with 
148  days even after considering for CJRS. When 
considering the BBLS, the residual life increases 
further from CJRS only scenario from 4 to 9  days 




Fig. 1  Distribution of the EBITDA under different scenarios. 
A Distribution of EBITDA in the ordinary scenario. B Distri-
bution of EBITDA in the COVID-19 scenario. C Distribution 
of EBITDA with government mitigation policies scenario
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by the SME). It is also clear from the analysis that 
the biggest beneficiaries of government intervention 
are South East and London, while worst hit areas are 
Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Table 6 shows the results of EBITDA effects of the 
COVID-19 for different industries.
In our ordinary scenario (columns 3–5, Table 6), 
SMEs in construction industry have the lowest 
expected EBITDA (£614,000) and a survival rate 
of 59%, while shortest residual life is in agriculture 
industry. SMEs in trade industry have the highest 
expected EBITDA (£3,04 million) and the high-
est survival probability of 78.4%. Manufacturing is 
the industry with the longest expected residual life 
for those SMEs burning cash (179  days). During 
COVID-19 scenario (with no government interven-
tion, columns 6–8), construction industry continues 
to be the worst performer and hardest hit on average 
with EBITDA of − 2,22 million GBP and survival 
probability of 31%, while SMEs in the trade indus-
try now hold only 108 days of cash. This finding is 
in line with the latest report from Bank of England 
on the expected impacts of COVID-19 by industry 
(Bank of England, 2020), where it is argued that 
consumer-facing businesses and non-food manu-
facturing and construction were the most affected 
sectors. Focusing on the government mitigation 
scenario (columns 9–13, Table 6), we find that both 
the average cash burning rate and the survival rate 
improve, and they are similar to the ordinary sce-
nario. Survival probability improves across indus-
tries between 2 and 12%. More specifically and 
focusing on CJRS only, SMEs now hold between 
16 and 48 additional days of cash, compared to 
COVID-19 levels. When considering the BBLS, the 
days of additional cash increase further compared 
Table 3  Weak firms – firms with expected negative EBITDA
This table presents the results for tree scenarios: ordinary scenario, impact of COVID-19 and government intervention policies, and 
their impact on the performance and residual life of the firm focusing only on the SMEs with expected negative EBITDA. The vari-
ables are defined as follows: EBITDA_B, estimate of the EBTDA under standard condition; SURVIVE_B, proportion of firms that 
have a positive estimated EBITDA; LIFE_DAYS_B, days of available cash to cover the negative EBITDA_B (the value is estimated 
only for those firms with a negative EBITDA_B; EBITDA_C, estimate of the EBTDA under COVID-1919 shock; SURVIVE_C, pro-
portion of firms that have a positive estimated EBITDA under COVID-19; LIFE_DAYS_C, days of available cash to cover the nega-
tive EBITDA_C (the value is estimated only for those firms with a negative EBITDA_C); EBITDA_G, estimate of the EBTDA under 
including the effect of government mitigation policies; SURVIVE_G, proportion of firms that have a positive estimated EBITDA 
under government mitigation policies; LIFE_DAYS_C, days of available cash to cover the negative EBITDA_G (the value is esti-
mated only for those firms with a negative EBITDA_G); JOB_LOSS_B, number of jobs at risk in the ordinary scenario (e.g. number 
of jobs linked to firms with a negative EBITDA_B); JOB_LOSS_G, number of jobs at risk in the COVID-19 scenario (e.g. number 
jobs linked to firms with a negative EBITDA_C); JOB_LOSS_G, number of jobs at risk in the scenario with mitigating policies (e.g. 
number jobs linked to firms with a negative EBITDA_G)
n 10,461
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Ordinary EBITDA_B  − 2852.23 3451.38  − 19,990.02  − 0.01
SURVIVE_B 0.00% - - -
LIFE_DAYS_B 164 151 - 547
COVID-19 EBITDA_C  − 3751.51 3961.70  − 24,907.47 -
SURVIVE_C 0.00% - - -
LIFE_DAYS_C 119 132 - 547
Gov’t mitigation policies EBITDA_G  − 2845.14 3566.87  − 19,997.38 16,184.65
SURVIVE_G 8.38% 0.28 - 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_G 186 151 - 547
LIFE_DAYS_G + 25,000 191 149 0 547
LIFE_DAYS_G + 50,000 194 148 1 547
Effects on jobs Job_loss_B 10,461
Job_loss_C 10,461
Job_loss_G 9,584
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to CJRS only scenario between 4 and 16  days 
(depending on industry and the loan option taken 
by the SME). We can also observe from our analy-
sis that the biggest hit industries are agriculture and 
construction, while the biggest beneficiaries are 
SMEs in service industry.
3.1  Robustness test
As a robustness check, we redo the analysis reported 
above using a smaller sample of 18,626 SMEs that 
have financial information for the year 2019. Results 
are reported in Table 7.
The analysis based on more recent dataset suggests 
that the average EBITDA moves from the expected 
2,128,000 without COVID-19 to − 3,320,000, and 
the number of firms having a positive EBITDA 
decreases from 77 to 22%. Also, the life expectancy 
for firms burning cash reduces from 171 to 121 days. 
Government intervention improves the average 
EBITDA that, nevertheless, remains in the negative. 
Besides, governmental intervention reduces the num-
ber of firms with negative EBITDA but only 41% of 
them have an expected positive EBITDA. If anything, 
the results based on more recent data suggest even a 
harsher effect of CONVID-19 as in the case of firms 
that turn to have a negative EBITDA (those with 
positive EBITDA used to be 41%), a smaller positive 
effect of the governmental intervention (the results 
using 2016–2018 data suggests that around half of the 
firm have a positive EBITDA). However, the differ-
ences are not statistically different.
All in all, the fact that the results of the robust-
ness test are qualitatively similar to those of the origi-
nal analysis confirms and reinforces our results in 
terms of huge negative impact and relatively reduced 
mitigation impact generated by the government 
intervention.
Table 4  Solid firms – firms with expected positive EBITDA
This table presents the results for tree scenarios: ordinary scenario, impact of COVID-19 and government intervention policies; and 
their impact on the performance and residual life of the firm focusing only on the SMEs with expected positive EBITDA. The vari-
ables are defined as follows: EBITDA_B, estimate of the EBTDA under standard condition; SURVIVE_B, proportion of firms that 
have a positive estimated EBITDA; LIFE_DAYS_B, days of available cash to cover the negative EBITDA_B (the value is estimated 
only for those firms with a negative EBITDA_B; EBITDA_C, estimate of the EBTDA under COVID-1919 shock; SURVIVE_C, pro-
portion of firms that have a positive estimated EBITDA under COVID-19; LIFE_DAYS_C, days of available cash to cover the nega-
tive EBITDA_C (the value is estimated only for those firms with a negative EBITDA_C); EBITDA_G, estimate of the EBTDA under 
including the effect of government mitigation policies; SURVIVE_G, proportion of firms that have a positive estimated EBITDA 
under government mitigation policies; LIFE_DAYS_C, days of available cash to cover the negative EBITDA_G (the value is esti-
mated only for those firms with a negative EBITDA_G); JOB_LOSS_B, number of jobs at risk in the ordinary scenario (e.g. number 
of jobs linked to firms with a negative EBITDA_B); JOB_LOSS_G, number of jobs at risk in the COVID-19 scenario (e.g. number 
jobs linked to firms with a negative EBITDA_C); JOB_LOSS_G, number of jobs at risk in the scenario with mitigating policies (e.g. 
number jobs linked to firms with a negative EBITDA_G)
n 31,940
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Ordinary EBITDA_B 3282.73 4095.59 0.12 19,995.18
SURVIVE_B 100.00% - 1.00 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_B
COVID EBITDA_C  − 162.63 2654.39  − 21,817.01 19,811.36
SURVIVE_C 54.97% 0.50 - 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_C 155 151 - 547
Gov’t Policies EBITDA_G 106.69 2516.90  − 19,247.13 19,811.36
SURVIVE_G 65.35% 0.48 - 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_G 180 153 - 547
LIFE_DAYS_G + 25,000 188 151 1 547
LIFE_DAYS_G + 50,000 193 150 1 547
Effects of jobs Job_loss_B 0
Job_loss_C 14,382
Job_loss_G 11,066
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4  Discussion and policy implications
The various strategies that have been implemented 
by the governments around the world (limiting peo-
ple’s circulation, closing entire industries and limiting 
the operations of firms in a direct or indirect way) in 
order to deal with containing COVID-19 pandemic 
are affecting the economy of every country. Despite 
the intervention governments are implementing, there 
is a large decline in the economic activity.
Governments’ interventions to mitigate this eco-
nomic shock seems to be mainly focused on allow-
ing SMEs to survive the period of (forced) reduced 
activity and to retain jobs so that they will be able to 
jumpstart as soon as the economy reopens. Our evi-
dence for UK SMEs suggests that the CJRS as well 
as BBLS address the problem but only to a certain 
extent. In fact, according to our estimate CJRS allows 
SMEs to cover some costs and protect cash as well 
as to retain around 17% of jobs that otherwise would 
have been lost. In addition, the joint effect of CJRS 
and BBLS allows SMEs with a negative EBITDA 
to extend their expected residual life by around 
2  months (i.e. increase the life under COVID-19 by 
35%) so that they can navigate the period of reduced 
activity and be ready when the economy will restart.
The policies implemented in the UK do not dis-
criminate ex ante between strong and weak SMEs. 
Our comparative results suggest that by helping all 
the firms without selecting those that merit more sup-
port, government is able to protect around 8% of the 
jobs (that is to reduce job losses that are expected to 
occur under COVID-19 because its adverse effect on 
solid SMEs). When we look at the jobs protected in 
strong SMEs (that is those SMEs that would have 
been expected to generate positive EBITDA oth-
erwise), the percentage goes up to 23% of the jobs. 
Besides, the scheme extends the residual life of weak 
SMEs from 119 to 191/194 days (that is by 2 months 
and a half), while in the case of strong SMEs, the 
scheme extends life from 155 to 188/193  days (that 
is by 1  month). Nevertheless, the average expected 
residual life for those SMEs burning cash does not 
tell the entire story since the distribution is highly 
skewed. As emerge by looking at Fig. 2A, B, and C, 
COVID-19 has a dramatic impact on the number of 
SMEs that can run out of cash in 30 and 60 days.
In the ordinary scenario, we estimate that 1498 
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30  days of cash to cover running costs, while addi-
tional 541 SMEs have up to 60  days. COVID-19 
increases threefold the number of SMEs with less 
than 30  days of cash (4701) as well as those with 
up to 60 days (additional 1518). Besides, out of 518 
SMEs with between 30 and 60 days of cash under the 
ordinary scenario, 510 (98%) end up with less than 
30 days in the case of COVID-19. This evidence sug-
gests that weak SMEs are hugely adversely affected 
by both a more negative EBITDA and reduced cash 
holdings because of an increase in the delinquency 
levels. All in all, 42% of the SMEs that have less than 
30 days of cash under COVID-19 scenario are in fact 
SMEs that were already very weak (firms with less 
than 60  days of residual life in the case of ordinary 
scenario).
The government intervention mitigates partially 
the negative impact: SMEs with up to 30 days of cash 
decrease from 4701 to 2140 by considering CJRS 
only and to 1550 by considering CJRS and BBLS at 
50,000 GBP. Similar reduction is obtained for SMEs 
with up to 60 days of cash. Thus, mitigation policies 
can cut up to 60% the number of SMEs that would 
have been expected to have less than 60 days of cash 
to cover their negative EBITDA in line with findings 
in other contexts (Block et  al., 2020). However, the 
huge increase in the number of SMEs that move from 
“up to 30” days to “up to 60” days of residual life is 
largely ascribed to already weak SMEs.
There is no doubt about (1) the importance to help 
firms that are facing an unprecedented crisis and (2) 
the need to identify and use innovative government 
supporting tools (Didier et al., 2021). However, it is 
also very important to set up tools that can properly 
support firms. Our results raise doubts on the effec-
tiveness of both UK schemes because of their non-
discriminatory nature (lack of proper upfront selec-
tion): they do not discriminate according to firms’ 
quality, industry, or area even if research suggests 
that COVID-19 has different impact on different 
types of firm (Fairlie & Fossen, 2021; Graeber et al., 
2021) and also because of its effect on consumer hab-
its (Keane & Neal, 2021; Mehta et  al., 2021; Wis-
niewski et al., 2021). Besides, our evidence suggests 
that those firms that benefit at most are, in fact, those 
that were already weak before COVID-19 even if this 
is not the strategy pursued by the UK government: 
sticking to the various government declaration, both 
schemes are not aimed at supporting weak firms, but 
they are supposed to protect the economic actors from 
Table 7  EBITDA effects of the COVID-19 – 2017–2019 sample
This table presents the estimates for EBITDA under the three different scenarios (ordinary scenario, impact of COVID-19 and gov-
ernment mitigation policies) focusing on different industries. The variables are defined as follows: EBITDA, earnings before interest 
depreciation and amortisation; SURVIVE, proportion of firms that have a positive estimated EBITDA under the three different sce-
narios; LIFE_DAYS, days of available cash to cover the negative EBITDA under the three different scenarios; LIFE_DAYS 25,000, 
residual days with BBLS at 25,000; LIFE_DAYS 50,000, residual days with BBLS at 25,000
Results on the entire dataset
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Basic EBITDA_B 18,718 2128.65 5972.35  − 39,618.84 96,722.75
SURVIVE_B 18,718 77.65% 0.42 - 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_B 2250 171 151 - 547
COVID EBITDA_C 18,718  − 3320.00 5830.00  − 56,631.00 83,463.00
SURVIVE_C 9998 22.02% 41% - 100%
LIFE_DAYS_C 18,693 112 123 - 547
Gov’t Policies EBITDA_G 18,693  − 1830.67 4609.45  − 42,820.38 83,463.15
SURVIVE_G 18,718 41.48% 0.49 - 1.00
LIFE_DAYS_G 6193 237 136 - 547
LIFE_DAYS_G + 25,000 6124 240 134 1 547
LIFE_DAYS_G + 50,000 6061 242 133 1 547
Effects of jobs Job_loss_B 4183
Job_loss_C 14,594
Job_loss_G 10,953
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an external shock. Our evidence supports the point 
that these schemes, by extending the life of weak 
firms, create more zombie firms that will not be able 
to trade properly when the schemes will close down 
(Thomas, 2021), so that the result is just postponing 
their bankruptcies (Schivardi et  al., 2020). In other 
words, our results suggest that very general schemes 
like these ones can end up throwing good money after 
bad.
The doubts about the effectiveness of the scheme 
are further reinforced by our analysis at industry and 
regional level: those industries and regions that are 
more economically adversely affected by the COVID-
19 are not those that enjoy the greatest benefit linked 
to the schemes, while those regions that appear to 
face a smaller economic negative impact related 
to COVID-19 are those that benefit the most by the 
intervention.
An effective supporting scheme should also put 
SMEs in a position to be able to jumpstart when the 
economy opens again. Currently, both CJRS and 
BBLS (irrespective the fact that it is called bouncing 
back loan scheme) do not address this aspect since 
the support provided targets the survival but does not 
provide the resources to re-start the business (e.g. 
build up the stock again, re-establish the link with 
customers). Thus, weak small and medium SMEs can 
even survive the period with no/or with much reduced 
sales just to incur the risk to fail resuming their 
activities because of lack of the extra resources when 
needed (Wiggins & Hancock, 2020). In addition, 
there are doubts about small firms capability to repay 
loans that have been largely given without any proper 
creditworthiness check (D. Thomas et al. 2020) rais-
ing moral hazard issues (Craig et al., 2007; Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981).
5  Conclusion
How long can SMEs survive during global economic 
crisis triggered by COVID-19? What are the effects 
of the UK government intervention to help SMEs to 
cope with the unforeseen economic shock? To shed 
some empirical light on these questions, moving from 
the shock on sales that SMEs face, we investigate 
how it affects the capability of the SMEs to gener-
ate positive EBITDA using data on over 42,401 UK 
small and medium SMEs across 28 industries from 
2016 to 2018. We also perform a robustness check by 
using 18,626 observation for the years 2017–2019.
We estimate earnings and then the “residual life” 




Fig. 2  Distribution of the residual days under different scenar-
ios. A Distribution of residual days in the ordinary scenario. B 
Distribution of residual days with COVID-19 scenario. C Dis-
tribution of residual days with government mitigation policies 
scenario
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of the SMEs under three different scenarios: (1) ordi-
nary scenario, expected values based on past perfor-
mance and not considering any negative effect linked 
to COVID-19 shock; (2) scenario with the shock on 
sales at industry level generated by COVID-19; and 
(3) scenario with the implementation of the UK gov-
ernment policies to support small SMEs (namely, 
CJRS and BBLS).
We find that COVID-19 has a huge impact on 
small and medium firms reducing the percentage 
of those with positive EBITDA (that we label solid 
ones) from 75 to 41%. Besides, for those that are 
defined as weak because they are expected to gen-
erate a negative EBITDA, the days of cash avail-
able to cover the negative EBITDA goes down from 
164 to 139 suggesting that COVID-19 not only 
increases the number of SMEs in weak position but 
also intensifies the speed at which cash is burned. 
At first sight, the government mitigation policies 
seem to be quite successful in supporting small- and 
medium-sized firms: on the one hand, the number 
of SMEs with positive EBITDA increases above 
50%; on the other, the residual life for SMEs that 
burn cash increases to 183  days in the scenario of 
CJRS, or between 189 and 194 days in the scenario 
of the joint effect of CJRS and BBLS. All in all, the 
policies have two main effects: (1) they reduce the 
number of SMEs with negative EBITDA by 10%, 
and (2) they extend the life of those SMEs that are 
burning cash by 50 to 60 days. Moreover, the effect 
of the government policies on jobs is quite relevant: 
according to our estimates, the number of jobs at 
risk, that is jobs in SMEs with negative EBITDA, 
increases by around 14,000 in our sample. The 
implementation of CJRS allows some SMEs to 
turnaround and has a positive EBITDA so that the 
number of jobs at risk decreases by 17%. However, 
our analysis on the subsamples of SMEs that gen-
erate negative EBITDA irrespective of COVID-19 
and those that turn to have a negative EBITDA only 
because of COVID-19 suggests that the SMEs that 
benefit the most in terms of extended days of life 
are those that are weak irrespective of COVID-19. 
This can have a very relevant negative impact later 
on, when firms that move from a very weak posi-
tion may not be able to repay their loans and the 
government might be asked to step in to cover the 
losses of default that banks will face (Craig et  al., 
2007; D. Thomas et al., 2020). On the positive side, 
the greater number of jobs that turn to be protected 
are linked to those SMEs that used to be strong that 
is those that are expected to be in a better position 
to jumpstart after COVID-19. When we focus on 
the regional impact, we find that the biggest ben-
eficiary of government intervention is the London 
area, while the hardest hit from the economic point 
of view are the SMEs in Scotland (lowest EBITDA 
and survival rate) and SMEs in Northern Ireland 
(with least cash days available). In terms of indus-
try impact, we find that the biggest hit industries are 
agriculture and construction, while SMEs in service 
industry seem not to be impacted as much but they 
are benefiting more from mitigation policies. Again, 
the evidence suggests that a plain-vanilla scheme 
struggles to provide support to the areas that need 
that support the most.
All in all, our evidence suggests mixed results in 
terms of benefit generated by the schemes: some pro-
tection in terms of job losses but overprotection of 
weak firms and un-match between industries/areas that 
are worst hit and those that benefit at most. We ascribe 
the mixed results to the characteristics of the schemes 
that in order to be simple to use and to facilitate firms 
access to them in a situation of extreme emergency, are 
not able to effectively discriminate between solid and 
less solid SMEs, so that the scheme may just play the 
role of postponing the bankruptcy of weak firms. The 
lack of discrimination and the potential relatively large 
number of defaults on the BBLS loans from weak firms 
can generate a large cash outflow the UK taxpayer 
when they will be asked to cover the losses the banks 
will incur. Interestingly enough, new rounds/extension 
of the schemes did not introduce major changes, for 
instance, in terms of selection of firms that are allowed 
to access the schemes. In fact, this evidence raises a 
question that opens to further research: does the lack of 
proper upfront selection, by extending the life of weak 
economic actors and precluding the “natural selection” 
of firms, destroy national wealth?
Our work suffers from at least two limitations. First, 
we use a sample (not the entire population of UK small 
SMEs), and we rely on estimates in terms of small 
SMEs’ performance that is based on the 2016–2018 
data. Thus, even if we use a relatively larger dataset, we 
cannot rule out that results can be different if the entire 
population is used. Besides, even if we perform addi-
tional test with more recent data that suggest no qualita-
tively different results, nevertheless, we cannot rule out 
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that the outcomes can be different when data from the 
entire population including data for 2019 financial per-
formance is used. Finally, our entire analysis is based 
on estimation of the current situation faced by SMEs 
since there are no available data. These weaknesses 
suggest areas for further research, namely, reproduce 
the analysis with larger and more updated dataset when 
they are available. In addition, it can be interesting to 
cross-check the results we obtained when historical data 
will be available. Second, our work is limited in terms 
of area covered: we explore the role of policies in the 
UK only, but COVID-19 is a world problem. It can be 
very interesting to explore and compare policies imple-
mented by other countries. For instance, it can be inter-
esting to compare CJRS that has been set up explicitly 
for the COVID-19 with similar job protection schemes 
available in Italy or Germany for many years and that 
have been marginally adjusted to accommodate the dra-
matic impact of COVID-19 situation. Similarly, it can 
be interesting to compare the situation for SMEs in the 
UK that implemented a moderate to rigid lockdown 
with the one of Italy or Spain that implemented a very 
strict and rigid lockdown, or with the one of Sweden 
that decided for a completely different strategy (no for-
mal lockdown with strong recommendation for social 
distancing and reduce social activity).
Notwithstanding the limitation, our work provides 
a first clear evidence on the impact of the COVID-19 
on the UK economy and the effect of the mitigation 
policies implemented by the UK government.
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